Zadekpedia2017-04-09 · Guest: Andrei Illarionov (Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute) · 17:29
Filed under: Elections and politics
Topics: Democracy
The political landscape of Russia and the Kremlin regime
Bob Zadek interviews Andrei Illarionov, a former chief economic advisor to Vladimir Putin and current Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, about the political landscape of Russia. They discuss the critical distinction between the Russian people and the Kremlin regime, the history of democratic aspirations in Russia, and the violent suppression of opposition movements.
Topics: Russia, Vladimir Putin, Democracy, Autocracy, Political Persecution, Cato Institute, Russian History
Speakers: Bob Zadek, Andrei Illarionov
Introduction to Russia [00:29]
Bob Zadek: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to the Bob Zadek Show, the only live libertarian talk radio show on the air all weekend. Thanks so much for listening.
This morning is a show that, in my mind, I’ve been wanting to do for several years. The show is about Russia. Is Russia an ally, a trusted ally of the United States, an untrusted ally of the United States, or a country to be feared? I grew up in the ’50s when Russia presented the largest and only existential threat. We grew up, we were taught to fear Russia and Russians. The situation, of course, is very, very different today, but yet it is muddled.
Introducing Andrei Illarionov [01:29]
Bob Zadek: To help us understand what our relationship with Russia is, what it should be, and more importantly, to help us understand Russia itself—the regime and the people—I’m quite proud to welcome to the show Andrei Illarionov. Andrei is right now a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity. He was the chief economic advisor to Russian President Vladimir Putin from 2000 to 2005. He served as Putin’s personal representative in the G8 conference. He received his PhD from St. Petersburg University in 1987, and from ‘93 to ‘94, he served as chief economic advisor to the Russian Prime Minister. There is no one who can help answer these very difficult questions than Andrei. Andrei, welcome to the show this morning.
Andrei Illarionov: Good morning, Bob.
Regime vs. People [02:35]
Bob Zadek: Now, Andrei, I was careful in my introduction to introduce Russia as two concepts rather than one: the Russian regime and the Russian people. Was that an appropriate dichotomy to set forth? Help us expand or learn about the difference between Russia the people and Russia the regime.
Andrei Illarionov: I really appreciate it that you put this distinction and started exactly from this distinction. Traditionally in the West, in the United States, and outside of Russia, people call the country, the nation, the people, and the regime just with one word: Russia. It is understandable. It is easy. It’s easy to use just one word and to use it for all cases.
But since I’m Russian, and since I know many Russians who have very different views about the current regime—many of them are fighting that regime, some of them became victims of that regime, many of those people are still fighting in different ways and cannot agree with that—I really appreciate it if, at least in our show, in our discussion, we would try to put a clear distinction between the political regime, between the Kremlin, between Putin on one side, and the people of Russia on the other side.
We should be also absolutely clear that not all Russians are fighting the current political regime. It would be incorrect to say so. Yes, some people do support the regime, but if we would have a very good sociological study—really good—we would find that probably not so many, in reality, do support the regime. Just check the number of people who go to public manifestations or demonstrations or meetings on the streets of the Russian cities and towns. When the opposition calls for demonstrations, okay, in such cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg, up to 50 or 100 or 150,000 people are coming to the streets. If the regime is calling people and paying them for coming to the streets, okay, sometimes 5,000, sometimes 8,000, sometimes 10,000 people are coming to the streets. It gives you, maybe not exact numbers of the two parts of the Russian societies, but at least some flavor of the distinction between the Russian people and the current political regime in the Kremlin.
Now, you live in the United States now. Of course, there are a lot of Americans who do not support the Trump government, as was the case with Obama and Bush and Clinton. So, the distinction could also be made in the United States that there is the government and the people. Is it a difference—is it only a difference in degree, or is there a quality difference between government and people in the United States versus government and people in Russia?
Andrei Illarionov: There is one more very serious difference between the US situation and the Russian situation. The main difference is that the United States is a political democracy. It means that every four years, people have a chance and have an opportunity to choose a new administration. And if they succeed, Democrats will be replaced with Republicans, or Republicans will be replaced with Democrats. Certainly, it’s not a guarantee, and it needs some political mobilization on one side or the other side of the political spectrum, but it can be changed, and as we have seen even very recently, these changes are happening.
The current Russia is not a political democracy. It is an autocracy, and some people claim that it’s already not only an authoritarian political regime but maybe semi-totalitarian—maybe not fully as it was in the Soviet Union, but it’s very much closer than even the standard so-called autocratic regimes. And it means that the Russian people cannot change the government even if the majority of people would like to do so. And this is a big difference because the Russian political regime, the current political regime in the Kremlin, uses all possible resources and instruments, including not only bribery but also coercion, violence, and outright murder to prevent changes in the political regime, in changes in the government.
The Aspiration for Democracy [05:58]
Bob Zadek: I have traveled a bit in Eastern Europe and in Russia, and I did not—granted, I was there for a very short period of time, my contact with Russian people was quite selective—but I didn’t detect, as best as I could look around and observe, a hunger for democracy. There didn’t—now, maybe there is, and you’ll help me understand that it’s there but it’s hidden. Are the Russian people—do they aspire for democracy? Are they ready for democracy? And could they adjust to a democratic regime, a democratically elected regime? Andrei, are the Russian people ready for and aspire for democracy?
Andrei Illarionov: If we use the same indicator that I started to mention, the number of people who go to the streets, in March ‘91, the largest demonstration in the recent history of the country, when 800,000 people gathered in the center of Moscow. They were coming to demonstrate for democracy. But it is rather hard to continue the demonstration for democracies if you are persecuted. Just over the last years, many champions for democracy have been brutally beaten, put in jail, and even murdered.
The person who was the hope for millions of Russians, Galina Starovoitova, who was running as a candidate for the Russian presidency, has been killed in 1998. Anna Politkovskaya, an outstanding journalist who was supporting democracy, has been killed in 2006. Boris Nemtsov, one of the leaders of the Russian opposition, has been killed in 2015. In 2012, more than 100,000 people went to the downtown of Moscow to demonstrate for fair elections. Several hundreds of them have been taken and put into jail, and they spent several years just to demonstrate in front of the Kremlin. Just few days ago, on March 26th this year, in 99 cities around the country, tens of thousands and maybe hundreds of thousands of people went to demonstrate for democracy. The result was that more than 1,000 people have been arrested and put in jail. Some of them stay in jail until today.
So, it gives you some understanding of what does it mean to demonstrate inspiration for democracy if the award for that could be beaten or jailed or even worse. It does not mean that it is easy to build democracy in such a country like Russia, but if people who want to build democracy, who would like to live with a democratic political regime, are punished with such violence, with such danger and such a risk for their life, it is not so easy.
The Cost of Dissent [11:00]
Andrei Illarionov: I started to answer just mentioning the same indicator that we started to use a little bit a few minutes before. In March ‘91, there was the largest demonstration in the history of the country, when 800,000 people gathered in the center of Moscow. They were coming to demonstrate for democracy. But it is rather hard to continue the demonstration for democracies if you are persecuted. Just over the last years, many champions for democracy have been brutally beaten, put in jail, and even murdered.
The person who was the hope for millions of Russians, Galina Starovoitova, who was running as a candidate for the Russian presidency, has been killed in 1998. Anna Politkovskaya, an outstanding journalist who was supporting democracy, has been killed in 2006. Boris Nemtsov, one of the leaders of the Russian opposition, has been killed in 2015. In 2012, more than 100,000 of people went to downtown of Moscow to demonstrate for fair elections. Several hundreds of them have been taken and put into jail, and they spent several years just to demonstrate in front of the Kremlin. Just few days ago, on March 26th this year, in 99 cities around the country, tens of thousands and maybe hundreds of thousands of people went to demonstrate for democracy. The result was that more than 1,000 people have been arrested and put in jail. Some of them stay in jail until today.
So, it gives you some understanding what does it mean to demonstrate inspiration for democracy if the so-called award for that could be beaten or jailed or even worse. It does not mean that it is easy to build democracy in such a country like Russia, but if people who want to build democracy, who would like to live with a democratic political regime, are punished with such violence, with such danger and such a risk for their life, it is not so easy.
Understanding Democracy in Practice [14:20]
Bob Zadek: Do the Russian people, when they hit the streets and protest for democracy, is the operation of democracy—is it sometimes I’m concerned that democracy is a vague ideal, something akin to freedom, where everybody automatically aspires for democracy without appreciating that sometimes it’s complex and sometimes it doesn’t produce a very satisfactory result? And just as a matter of curiosity, democracy as an abstract concept has to be understood. Is it taught in a way in the Russian system so that there is a healthy knowledge of what democracy actually means in practice, or is it merely—and I don’t mean to minimize it—is it merely just an abstract ideal?
Andrei Illarionov: Well, certainly the level of understanding in Russia of democracy could be different from the level in the United States or in Switzerland, and it is understandable since the US is living with a democratic political regime for the last 200 years, and many European countries more than a century. And democracy, this is a process of learning and of education, and today’s democracy in the United States is quite different from the democracy in the same United States 200 years ago. And even today, we could say that probably American democracy is not perfect yet, but it’s moving to that direction.
So, that’s a process. Same true for Russia, and Russia did not experience two centuries of democracy. It was not the case. There was several episodes in the Russian history, and all of them were rather short. Nevertheless, when democracy arrived, let’s say 25 years ago, Russians embraced it wholeheartedly, and democratic mechanisms and democratic institutions started to operate, not without mistakes, not without problems, but people really preferred to live under a democratic political regime rather than under autocratic. And the fight that Russia went through in the ’90s, it was also not only a fight through the so-called economic reforms or economic catastrophe, but also a fight for a democratic political regime. As we know, even very advanced European countries like Germany, who had a much stronger basement for building a democratic political regime…
Show prep notes
Bob’s own preparation for this episode.
(424) BOB-SHOW // (424) 262-7469
Notes:
Pronunciation (might want to practice this one!) Andrei Ill - LAR -ee- uh- nof
Hear Ian Vasquez’s pronunciation at the 38:00 mark of the Cato video.
Mention of Last Week’s Mishap: “I want to apologize to my guests for a technical problem at the station, which we have resolved. You can count on hearing my live show, without interruptions, each and every Sunday – the show of ideas, not attitude.”
Sunday: ****
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1 MINUTE WARNING
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Show Notes:
Main Article:
Background
Articles
Three Additional Topics
- Syria Gas Attack: Assad’s Doing or False Flag?
Show Notes:
Headline: Russia Today (Yesterday, and Tomorrow)
Some viewed the fall of the Soviet Union as the beginning of “The End of History.” The U.S. and its allies, it seemed, were ushering in an era of global liberal democracy. Today’s headlines remind us that history is not over. Russia’s aggressive imperialism in Ukraine and its meddling in the Middle East have put it back at center stage. The last 25 years of economic history in Russia are the backdrop to this foreign policy challenge to the West – a time in which the old guard “nomenklatura” gave up on the Soviet experiment and transferred economic ownership to a new set of political elites. This wasn’t anyone’s idea of a smooth transition to an independent democratic regime, but many free-market economists (including Milton Friedman) gladly offered advice on how to jumpstart Russia’s stagnant economy. Andrew Illarionov also served as an early advisor to President Putin – counseling sound monetary and fiscal policy – but resigned when it became clear how the new government was being run. Now a Senior fellow at the Cato Institute’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity and a key contributor to the Human Freedom Index, Andrei recently participated in a Cato symposium on what went wrong. He joins the show Sunday to describe the economic and political inner workings of the Putin government and the Russian oligarchy. What does economic freedom have to do with political freedom and foreign policy interventionism? A whole lot, it turns out. Tune in to the show to of ideas, not attitude, and call Bob and Andrei with your questions at (424) BOB-SHOW.
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Links
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What Went Wrong? 25 Years After the Fall of the Soviet Union Cato Event, December 8 2016
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The Human Freedom Index – By the Cato Institute, Fraser Institute and the Liberales Institut at the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom
Related Shows (Subscribe to the Podcast):
- Ian Vasquez on the Prospects for a Free Cuba — The Bob Zadek Show
**[BIO]** Andrei Illarionov is one of Russia’s most forceful and articulate advocates of an open society and democratic capitalism, and has been a long-time friend of the Cato Institute.
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Senior fellow at the Cato Institute’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity.
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Was the chief economic adviser of Russian President Vladimir Putin from 2000 to December 2005.
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Served as the president’s personal representative (sherpa) in the G-8.
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Received his Ph.D. from St. Petersburg University in 1987. From 1993 to 1994 Illarionov served as chief economic adviser to the prime minister of the Russian Federation, Viktor Chernomyrdin.
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He resigned in February 1994 to protest changes in the government’s economic policy. In July 1994 Illarionov founded the Institute of Economic Analysis and became its director.
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Illarionov has coauthored several economic programs for Russian governments and has written three books and more than 300 articles on Russian economic and social policies.
FIND HIS WORK AT:
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The Cato Institute’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity.
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Institute of Economic Analysis
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@AnIllarionov on Twitter
Main Article:
What Went Wrong? 25 Years After the Fall of the Soviet Union ** Minutes]**
Featuring David Satter, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute; Anders Åslund, Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council; and Andrei Illarionov, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute; moderated by Ian Vasquez, Cato Institute
“December 2016 marks the 25th anniversary of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of 15 independent post-Soviet states, including Russia. The political elite of the new Russia was to play a key role in a peaceful end of the communist empire that threatened nuclear Armageddon for almost half of a century. The world greeted the entry of an independent democratic Russia onto the international stage with genuine enthusiasm and great hope. Some even believed that the world was entering a promising new era. Twenty-five years later, Russia’s autocratic regime has effectively destroyed the domestic political opposition, media freedom, and independent courts. In foreign affairs, Russia has engaged in military aggressions in neighboring Georgia and Ukraine, and is actively involved in the civil war in Syria. It is meddling in the internal affairs of European countries and, some suspect, even the United States. Join us to hear our panelists discuss what went wrong and where Russia is likely headed.”
Anders Aslund:
What went right? Quite a lot. Failed coup of 1991 indicated a large victory for democracy.
Yeltsin dismantled Soviet Union peacefully, and avoided a civil war.
Young reformers, educated in economics, helped usher in sharp cuts in state-owned enterprises spending, and got rid of price controls, using “shock therapy” approach advocated by Milton Friedman, Andrei Schleifer and others.
Sins of Omission
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The opportunity to reform the central bank slipped away too quickly – began increasing money supply 10% a month, and led to hyperinflation (2500%!)
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Oil and gas prices were kept low, and Russian oligarchs took advantage of global arbitrage opportunity to buy at home and sell abroad.
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Not a strong enough political consensus to sustain the reforms over time.
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Keeping low oil and gas prices led to a budget deficit, which in turn led to more inflation.
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A decade of decline followed the hyperinflation, giving people a very negative impression of democracy.
What’s missing?
Economic collapse was the biggest driver of everything else.
David Sander - Hudson Institute
Sander blames the metaphysical denial of the value of the individual, which carried over from Soviet ideology to the Young Reformers, albeit under a capitalist, privatization framework.
Sanders says the Young Reformers closed their eyes to the massive corruption that took place in the reform, because they held that it was essential to privatize, regardless of whether or not it was fair.
Voucher privatization: Citizens were given vouchers to buy up shares in former state-owned enterprises, but the people didn’t understand the concept, nor trust the worth, and vouchers were bought up en masse. There was no civil society to undergird a market society.
Buying and selling of government officials was rampant among those who wanted to develop economic assets.
1990s: major demographic decline + alleged Chechen terrorism led to despair that made Putin’s rise possible. Sanders says it has come out that the bombings were staged by the FSB (Federal Security Service) to pave the way for the current rulers, who cemented the privatization.
The legacy of the Soviet Union lives on. Sander argues there needs to be a Truth Commission, to create a regime based on a real separation of power.
Andrei Illarionov
Performance has varied across Eastern European countries in the transition.
Economic transition was one thing, but now there is a transition of other areas – civil society, foreign policy, etc.
In Russia, there is rule of thugs, instead of rule of law.
Instead of communistic ideology, there is chauvinistic and imperialistic ideology.
Russian aggressions are mounting, as government is increasingly run by intelligence agencies, military, and oligarchy.
Freest elections in Russia happened between 1991 and 1996. Since 1999, Russian elections have all been fraudulent to some degree.
What happened? In short, catastrophe(s):
Economic Catastrophe – Russian history in 20th century reads as one catastrophe after another, from both World Wars, to the inter-war period (famine), up through the present.
Demographic Catastrophe – population losses of 11.5 to 19.5 million people.
Law and Order Catastrophe – crime has exploded since the fall of the Soviet Union. Lots of murders, suicides, etc.
Social Catastrophe – Education has failed.
Why? The interest of those in power during transition was to transfer property to those close to the previous centers of power.